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New York's SEQRA in the Courts
Gail Bowers*
I. Introduction
Since 1982 the number of court decisions on the State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)1 has exploded. 2
Early decisions stand'as landmarks which drew broad judicial
boundaries for the interpretation of a new statute. The pur-
pose of this article is to review recent decisions on SEQRA
and to highlight some of the more noteworthy opinions. The
substantive cases present new judicial views, and, in some in-
stances, articulate boundaries for the future. The procedural
cases tend to fill the interstices left by the early landmark de-
cisions. The article will be devoted to a discussion of both
substantive and procedural issues decided by the courts, and
will attempt to provide some guidance on where the courts
appear to be headed on some of the growth issues of the
1980's and beyond.
II. Substantive Aspects and Adequacy Issues
This section will focus on the substantive, or "action forc-
ing," aspects of SEQRA rather than the procedural aspects
considered in the next section. 3 It will highlight some of the
* Gail Bowers, J.D., Albany Law School (1982); Ass't Counsel for Regulatory Af-
fairs/SEQRA Counsel, New York Department Environmental Conservation.
1. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
SEQRA is also referred to as Article 8 of the ECL. The regulations adopted pursuant
to the statute are contained in N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 617.1-.21 (1987).
2. The Division of Legal Affairs of the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion has a record of slightly more than two hundred fifty SEQRA cases. In his article,
SEQRA in the Courts, Daniel A. Ruzow noted that over fifty decisions had been
handed down. 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1177, 1177 (1982).
3. The goals of SEQRA are those legislative priorities stated in N.Y. Envtl. Con-
serv. Law §§ 8-0101 & -0103 (McKinney 1984). The Legislature declared protection of
the environment to be a state policy and mandated that state and local agencies con-
1
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emerging issues such as conditioned negative declarations, al-
ternatives, and cumulative impacts. The court decisions here
deal with the judicial standards of review for environmental
impact statements (EIS), as well as determinations of signifi-
cance. Of particular interest is the application by the courts of
the "rule of reason"' and the extension of the H.O.M.E.S.
test 5 from negative declarations (determinations of no signifi-
cant impact) to the entire SEQRA process.
sider environmental factors and give them appropriate weight in their decisions. The
"action forcing" portion of the statute, set forth in § 8-0109(1) is to be read in rela-
tion to those goals. That subdivision requires agencies to act in accordance with the
state policy in choosing "alternatives which, consistent with social, economic and
other essential considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or avoid
adverse effects." The requirement of § 8-0109(1) is the heart of the substantive com-
ponent of SEQRA and constitutes a legal mandate to agencies to make the best possi-
ble effort to meet their environmental stewardship responsibilities. A determination
by an agency that an action may have significant environmental impacts requires
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This document must dis-
close and analyze impacts, alternatives to the action, and possible mitigation mea-
sures to reduce impacts. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.14 (1987).
4. The "rule of reason," like the H.O.M.E.S. test, (discussed infra note 5) is
drawn from the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) cases, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-70a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). It was discussed in Coalition Against Lincoln
West v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d 483, 491, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 805, 457 N.E.2d 795, 469 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1983), and Environmental
Defense Fund v. Flacke, 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1983) and held
applicable to SEQRA, particularly for interpretation of substantive issues.
H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 98 Misc. 2d 790, 414 N.Y.S.2d 988,
modified, 67 A.D.2d 222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1979). The rule of reason limits
the discussion of impacts solely to reasonably potential impacts, and states that not
every conceivable alternative need be addressed in an EIS. The court of appeals, in
Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503
N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986), has distinguished SEQRA from NEPA, noting that SEQRA im-
poses substantive, action-forcing requirements on agencies. Id. at 415, 494 N.E.2d at
434, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
5. The H.O.M.E.S. test originated in H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev.
Corp., 98 Misc. 2d 790, 414 N.Y.S.2d 988, modified, 69 A.D.2d 222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827
(4th Dep't 1979) which took the test from NEPA cases. The three part test, some-
times also called the "hard look" test, requires an agency to 1) identify relevant areas
of environmental concern, 2) thoroughly analyze those areas to determine if the ac-
tion may have a significant adverse impact, and 3) support its determination with
reasoned elaboration. H.O.M.E.S., 69 A.D.2d at 231-32, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832. A nega-
tive declaration is a determination that an action will not have any significant envi-
ronmental impacts. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.2(y) (1987).
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/2
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A. Judicial Review of Determinations of Significance
The H.O.M.E.S. test has been the standard of review
used by all four appellate divisions in New York. In most
cases, the determination undergoing review has been a nega-
tive declaration, and the challenge has been made without a
hearing.' The "hard look" issue is generally framed according
to the traditional standard of whether the agency's decision
was arbitrary and capricious. 7
It is interesting to compare agency determinations that
have been upheld with those which have been annulled based
upon the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
In Soule v. Town of Colonie,8 members of the Shaker religious
sect challenged a negative declaration issued for a municipal
sports stadium conceded to be a Type I action,9 which was
proposed to adjoin to an important Shaker cemetery. The
court noted that its review was limited to whether the deter-
minations of the agency were made according to proper proce-
dure, and whether or not the determinations were arbitrary
and capricious in light of the low threshold for determining
significance of an action.'0 The court noted that, to support
the negative declaration, the three-part H.O.M.E.S. test must
be met." It was found that an environmental assessment form
(EAF) and a comprehensive engineering report were submit-
ted, both of which were found to have identified and provided
for mitigation of "each and every criterion affecting the envi-
ronment."12 Thus, respondents were found to have "made a
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9 to 22.
7. The arbitrary and capricious standard is derived from N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
§ 7803 (McKinney 1981) (CPLR).
8. 95 A.D.2d 979, 464 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1983).
9. A Type I action, pursuant to N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.12, is
one which meets certain thresholds and which is deemed to be more likely than other
actions to require preparation of an EIS.
10. Soule, 95 A.D.2d at 981, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
11. Id. See supra note 5.
12. Id. at 981, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 579. The court of appeals, in Chinese Staff &
Workers, Ass'n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 365, 502 N.E.2d 176, 179-80, 509
N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (1986), held the term "environment" to be very broadly defined in
Part 617. The criteria promulgated at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11
are a checklist of examples which, if certain thresholds are met, require preparation
19871
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thorough investigation of all the problems involved and rea-
sonably exercised their discretion. ' '13 The agency determina-
tion, therefore, was upheld.
Contrast Soule with Inland Vale Farm Co. v. Stergianop-
olous,'" in which a local planning board issued a negative dec-
laration along with its approval of a site plan for a commercial
and office center. The EAF, however, had indicated that sur-
face or ground water quality would be adversely impacted by
the plan. The court held that more than a mere identification
of an impact is required to satisfy the "hard look" test. The
agency must also require that an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) be prepared, otherwise, its negative declaration is
arbitrary and capricious."'
The agency in Inland Vale failed to adequately identify
or analyze impacts, and failed to act in accordance with state
policy as articulated by Article 8 of the Environmental Con-
servation Law (ECL); the agencies in Soule recognized the po-
tential for significant impacts and addressed them through
mitigation measures. The differences between Inland Vale
Farm and Soule give fairly clear guidance regarding the need
for complete and adequate information for review, adherence
to the Part 617 criteria, reasoned elaboration which does not
overlook significant impacts, and a decision to require an EIS
when the criteria are met.'"
of an EIS for an action whether the action is Type I or Unlisted.
13. Soule, 95 A.D.2d at 982, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 580. An unrelated issue raised by
this case is the court's sanctioning of what was essentially a conditioned negative
declaration (CND) on a direct agency action. For a discussion of CNDs, see infra,
notes 17 to 24 and accompanying text.
14. 104 A.D.2d 395, 478 N.Y.S.2d 926 (2d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 718, 481
N.E.2d 547, 492 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1985). See also Kirk-Astor Drive Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Town of Pittsford, 106 A.D.2d 868, 483 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1984)(regarding the
pitfalls of using an incomplete or inadequate EAF substitute).
15. Inland Vale, 104 A.D.2d at 397, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
16. Several courts have indicated the need for adequate documentation, or writ-
ten elaboration, of the reasons for determinations of significance (particularly nega-
tive declarations), if agencies are to provide adequate evidence that their decisions
are not arbitrary and capricious. This documentation is also needed to provide the
courts with an adequate basis of review. Even for Unlisted actions, for which filing
requirements are simplified, courts have required a showing that some analytical pro-
cess has occurred prior to the issuance of a determination. Although there is not the
[Vol. 5
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B. Can a Negative Declaration Be Subject to Conditions?
The question of conditioned negative declarations (CND)
requires a look at the issue of mitigation. Clearly, the primary
purpose of SEQRA is prevention of environmental damage. 17
Thus mitigation measures, either voluntarily proposed by a
project sponsor, or imposed or negotiated by an agency, are an
important issue in the approval of a project through the
SEQRA process. The statute requires that an EIS discuss mit-
igation measures 18 and that a findings statement be issued
stating that, to the maximum extent practicable, adverse im-
pacts will be minimized or avoided.' 9 Although the statute
contemplates that the EIS and findings statement act as tools
for setting forth and deciding upon mitigation measures,20 in a
number of cases mitigation measures were used as conditions
attached to a negative declaration.2' Such a mechanism effec-
tively prevents a project from reaching the EIS threshold.
In Soule v. Town of Colonie22 and Manes v. Simpson,23
cases in which agencies were acting directly, the EAF2' and
supporting documents proposed specific methods to be used
to mitigate identified adverse environmental impacts. Despite
obvious problems of subsequent self-enforcement of such non-
opportunity in this article to further probe this topic, the readers are directed to a
review of Tehan v. Scrivani, 97 A.D.2d 769, 468 N.Y.S.2d 402 (2d Dep't 1983), and
Oak Beach v. Lehman, 100 A.D.2d 906, 474 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2d Dep't 1984)(indicating
the courts' unwillingness to tolerate a conclusory or virtually non-existent decision
record).
17. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0101 (McKinney 1984).
18. Id. § 8-0109(2)(f).
19. Id. § 8-0109(8); see also Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conser-
vation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
20. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0109(1), (2)(f) (McKinney 1984).
21. H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 418
N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1979) involved a conditioned negative declaration. More re-
cently, the court of appeals considered the concept in Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n
v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 364, 502 N.E.2d 176, 178, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501-
02 (1986).
22. 95 A.D.2d 979, 464 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1983).
23. 108 A.D.2d 914, 485 N.Y.S.2d 802 (2d Dep't 1985).
24. EAF forms are used by agencies to obtain and analyze basic project informa-
tion in order to make a determination of significance. N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs.
tit. 6, § 617.5 (1987).
5
30 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
binding conditions by agencies undertaking direct actions, the
courts approved negative declarations in both cases.2 5 A some-
what different set of circumstances existed in Southampton
Association v. Planning Board.26 This case involved a grant of
final plat approval for a subdivision. A portion of the parcel
had an historic house located on it which the developer in-
tended to preserve. The village board issued its negative dec-
laration based upon mitigation measures which were negoti-
ated with the project sponsor, and which were to be enforced
by restrictive covenants in the deeds.27
Although conditioned negative declarations were not di-
rectly addressed in the statute, they seem to have met with a
degree of court approval. Their continued use was the subject
of recent debate in the revision process for the Part 617
regulations.2
C. How Do the Courts Review an EIS?
The judicial standard of review of an EIS and the find-
ings" is somewhat confusing. The reason for the confusion is
partly the result of application of the H.O.M.E.S. test to EIS
review, and partly the result of lack of clarity as to whether
procedural or substantive aspects of SEQRA are being re-
viewed. In all cases, the EIS process includes a record upon
which an agency decision is made, whether written comments
or hearing testimony are involved.30 Thus, the traditional
Civil Practice Law and Rule (CPLR) Article 78 standards are
applicable. These standards require a finding of a rational ba-
25. Soule, 95 A.D.2d at 981, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 579; Manes, 108 A.D. at 915, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 804.
26. 109 A.D.2d 204, 491 N.Y.S.2d 388 (2d Dep't 1985).
27. Id. at 207, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
28. Various arguments for and against the use of conditioned negative declara-
tions have been discussed in the generic EIS accompanying the 1987 text amend-
ments to Part 617. The GEIS is available from the Department of Environmental
Conservation, 50 Wolf Road, Albany, N.Y. 12233.
29. Findings are statements in support of a decision on an action based on facts
and conclusions in the EIS. Such a statement includes a certification that the action
meets the statutory requirements of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(8) (McKin-
ney 1984).
30. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0109(4), -0113(2)(i) (McKinney 1984).
[Vol. 5
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sis and of substantial evidence in the record to support the
decision.31 Review of an EIS and the findings statement based
on it, requires an examination of the substantive aspects of
the SEQRA process. When a court considers the adequacy of
an EIS or the basis for a findings statement, it puts itself
squarely into substantive issues.
The H.O.M.E.S. test was extended to apply to the review
of an EIS by the First Department in Coalition Against Lin-
coln West v. City of New York,3" and by the Second Depart-
ment in Environmental Defense Fund v. Flacke3 This exten-
sion of the test clouded the issue of review, because both
decisions refer to the need for literal compliance with SEQRA
and the use of the "hard look" test to determine literal com-
pliance.3 4 In both cases, the courts also noted that courts
should construe SEQRA "in light of the rule of reason" and
be able to conclude that their determinations were supported
by substantial evidence.35 By throwing all these procedural
and substantive standards and tests into one case review,
these early substantive decisions set a confusing example for
others to follow. Further, by relying on the "hard look" test,
the courts may have restricted their ability to adequately re-
view whether an agency has met the substantive requirements
of SEQRA in regard to the agency's duty to avoid and miti-
gate adverse environmental impacts.
A decision which has helped to clarify one court's judicial
reasoning in an EIS review is Aldrich v. Pattison.3 In this
case, the Second Department took the opportunity to "clarify
the judicial standard of review" applicable in substantive,
31. See Town of Hempstead v. Flacke, 82 A.D.2d 183, 187, 441 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490
(2d Dep't 1981); and Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 313 N.E.2d 321, 325,
356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974).
32. 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 805, 457 N.E.2d 795, 469
N.Y.S.2d 689 (1983).
33. 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1983).
34. Environmental Defense Fund, 96 A.D.2d at 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 761; see
also Coalition, 94 A.D.2d at 491, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
35. Environmental Defense Fund, 96 A.D.2d at 863, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63; Co-
alition, 94 A.D.2d at 491-92, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
36. 107 A.D.2d 258, 486 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep't 1985).
1987]
7
32 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
rather than procedural, cases. 7 After reviewing the specific
statutory and regulatory requirements for procedural issues,
the court turned its attention to judicial review of substantive
compliance. 8 It noted the relatively meager guidance pro-
vided by the statute as to the list of information to be in-
cluded and analyzed in an EIS.39 The court stated that in or-
der to determine substantive compliance, the "hard look" test
is to be applied along with the rule of reason standard."0 In
order to undertake its review, the court considered each issue
raised by the petitioner, assessed the information identified
and analyzed by the respondent lead agency, and found that
each impact had been adequately addressed. The court con-
cluded that by combining these standards, close review of an
EIS's adequacy, and thus the adequacy of the basis for an
agency's findings, would be achieved. 1
The court of appeals made numerous references to the
Aldrich decision in its opinion rendered in Jackson v. New
York State Urban Development Corp.42 It noted that its re-
view must be tempered by viewing an agency's substantive ob-
ligations "in light of the rule of reason" and by recognizing
that the statutory scheme allows agencies "considerable lati-
tude in evaluating environmental effects and choosing among
alternatives. 4 3 Although describing its review as "supervisory
only," the court undertook a searching and detailed review of
the record to ensure that reasoned consideration was given to
all pertinent issues."' Only by undertaking such detailed re-
views can the courts ensure that the substantive mandates of
the statute are met.
37. Id. at 263, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
38. Id. at 265, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
39. Id. at 265, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29 (citing N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-
0109(2) (McKinney 1984)).
40. Id. at 265-66, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
41. Id. at 265-67, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 31-36.
42. 67 N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986).
43. Id. at 417, 494 N.E.2d at 436, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
44. Id.
[Vol. 5
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D. The Range of Alternatives Issue
The most often discussed aspects of the EIS process in
recent court decisions have been: (1) the consideration of al-
ternatives; (2) the range of alternatives that must be aired;
and (3) whether government project sponsors have a different
burden than private project sponsors to consider a broader
range of alternatives.
Webster Associates v. Town of Webster45 was the first
case to focus directly on the alternatives issue. In Webster,
the litigation was brought, in part, by the sponsor of a com-
peting project which was not discussed as an alternative in the
draft EIS (DEIS)."' The issue was whether a discussion of al-
ternatives in a final EIS (FEIS) was sufficient compliance.
The court of appeals' holding that the FEIS discussion was
adequate was based upon a recognition of broad community
and official awareness of, and debate on, the alternative pro-
ject, in addition to the attendance and comment of Webster
Associates at public hearings.
In response to the question of which alternatives must be
considered, the First Department, in Coalition Against Lin-
coln West v. City of New York,47 stated that "SEQRA does
not require that every conceivable alternative must be consid-
ered,""8 but rather that "reasonableness and balance" is the
rule. 9 The court went on to note that an agency must look at
"viable alternatives" and have enough information to "permit
a reasoned conclusion. ' 5° A similar result was reached by the
Second Department in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Flacke (EDF). 1 In EDF, the court concluded that alternatives
to a proposed power plant that would not meet applicable am-
bient air quality standards need not be considered because
45. 59 N.Y.2d 220, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). The project was
controversial and received much local public attention, some of which was generated
by the sponsor of a competing project.
46. Id. at 227.
47. 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1983).
48. Id. at 491, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
49. Id. at 492, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
50. Id., 465 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
51. 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1983).
19871
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they were not viable.5 2 The court also noted that although pe-
titioner's proposal was not considered, a similar proposal was
discussed, thereby providing a sufficient basis for analytical
discussion. 3
In Horn v. IBM,5" a recent Second Department case, ad-
ditional guidance was provided concerning when alternatives
must be considered, and what duty a private developer has
regarding site alternatives. In Horn, IBM sought to build in a
residentially zoned area, and accordingly acquired options on
several parcels of land. In support of its rezoning request,
IBM submitted a draft generic EIS (DGEIS) 5 Plaintiff, a
neighbor of the preferred site, argued that the draft and a fi-
nal GEIS submitted by IBM failed to adequately address al-
ternative locations for the project.56 The draft GEIS con-
tained a discussion of alternative uses for the chosen site as
well as references to other parcels in the town which, although
not under option to IBM, might be considered. IBM argued
that the impacts would be the same despite the particular site
chosen. 7
The court concluded that the discussion of alternatives in
the draft and final GEIS complied with SEQRA.5 It stated
that "a crucial factor to consider is whether the applicant is a
private developer or a governmental agency."59 The distinc-
tion, the court reasoned, is crucial because of the broader
range of alternative sites available to government agencies
through the use of eminent domain. Economic factors limit a
private developer's choices, so that it "would be unrealistic,
and, indeed, onerous" to require a developer to option or
purchase various sites so as to present them as alternatives.6 0
Because IBM was asked to do a generic EIS by the town,
52. Id. at 864, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
53. Id. at 864, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
54. 110 A.D.2d 87, 493 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1985).
55. Id. at 89, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
56. Id. at 92, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 188. A GEIS is used for a more conceptual review
of an action. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.15 (1987).
57. Horn, 110 A.D.2d at 94, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
58. Id. at 100, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
59. Id. at 95, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
60. Id. at 95, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
[Vol. 5
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/2
SEQRA IN THE COURTS
a question remains as to why a conceptual review of site alter-
natives was not done before IBM committed itself to a partic-
ular site. It is also interesting to note that the limited alterna-
tive standard applied to private developers is restricted to site
alternatives and not to use, size, or other alternatives. Thus,
although the court has responded with a reasoned approach to
site selection for private applicants, the debate continues as to
whether a home builder, for example, must discuss an office
park as an alternative, or whether a smaller, less profitable
project must be discussed by an applicant.
E. Cumulative Impacts
Attention has focused recently on the issue of cumulative
impacts. Although the issue of long-term impacts was raised
in the early years,61 increasing sophistication on the synergis-
tic, chronic, secondary, and precedent-setting impacts of cer-
tain actions has resulted in court review at both the appellate
division and the court of appeals.2 The regulations promul-
gating SEQRA require consideration of cumulative impacts in
determining the significance of an action."
In Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany,64 the Ap-
pellate Division, Third Department held that the city was re-
quired to consider the cumulative impact of a number of de-
velopment proposals, totaling almost three hundred acres, 5 in
a unique environmental setting.66 The court also held that the
61. See, Onondaga Landfill Sys., Inc. v. Flacke, 81 A.D.2d 1022, 440 N.Y.S.2d
788 (4th Dep't 1981).
62. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 117 A.D.2d 267, 502 N.Y.S.2d 540
(3d Dep't 1986); Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359,
502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
63. N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 617.11(a)(11), (b) (1987) directly or
indirectly require consideration of cumulative impacts. Also sections 617.14(f)(3), (4)
require an EIS to describe short and long-term effects and typical associated effects,
as well as any adverse environmental effects of an action.
64. 117 A.D.2d 267, 502 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dep't 1986). The court of appeals af-
firmed the merits of this decision in an opinion strongly supportive of SEQRA's pur-
poses. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 70 N.Y.2d 193, 512 N.E.2d 526, 518
N.Y.S.2d 943 (1987).
65. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Al-
bany County, May 17, 1985) on file at Pace Envtl. Law Rev. office.
66. Save the Pine Bush, 117 A.D. at 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
1987]
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failure to provide a reasoned elaboration of the consideration
of that issue required nullifying the related zoning change .
7
In Chinese Staff & Workers Association v. City of New
York, e8 the court of appeals decided a case based upon New
York City's own environmental regulations.6 9 This case in-
volved the issues of whether impacts on community character
are environmental, rather than social and economic, 70 and
whether long-term displacement of residences and businesses
could be considered in a determination of significance. The
case involved a proposed luxury high-rise condominium in a
special zoning district created to preserve the residential char-
acter of Chinatown. Once the court determined that commu-
nity character was an environmental impact, it then consid-
ered the need to address both short and long-term, primary
and secondary impacts, including potential gentrification im-
pacts of luxury housing in a working class neighborhood. 1
Having failed to consider those impacts, the city's approval of
the action was nullified. 2
By focusing attention on the need to consider cumulative
impacts, these decisions highlight the need for agencies to
67. Id. The unpublished decision of the New York Supreme Court, Albany
County. (Conway, J.) contains an interesting analysis of the effects of a number of
separate projects, stating: "These harmful environmental impacts are cumulative be-
cause they increase in magnitude and severity as the number of individual projects
constructed increases." Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, slip op. at 6 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Albany County, (May 17, 1985) on file at Pace Envtl. Law Rev. office.
68. 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
69. City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR), N.Y. City Exec. Order 91 (Aug.
24, 1977). The court declined to say whether it would reach the same conclusion
under SEQRA. However, the issue of secondary impacts, explicitly required to be
considered under CEQR, is implicit in the term "cumulative impacts" as used in the
SEQRA regulations. Many of the impacts considered in an EIS are not primary im-
pacts (site-specific impacts such as removal of trees to construct a building) but are
secondary (traffic or growth inducement, for example). The court of appeals agreed
that the state statute would require a similar result in its decision in Save the Pine
Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 70 N.Y.2d 193, 512 N.E.2d 526, 518 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1987).
70. See supra note 12.
71. Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d 366, 367-68, 502 N.E.2d at 180-81, 509 N.Y.S.2d at
503-04.
72. Although not at issue in this case, the court noted that the city failed to
address the issue of community character when it created the zoning district, so the
city would have to consider it on each project. Id. at 367 n.9, 502 N.E.2d at 181 n.9,
509 N.Y.S.2d at 504 n.9.
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consider the potential damage to finite resources caused by a
case by case approach to project approvals. The decisions
should encourage agencies to think about cumulative impacts
before the initial incremental impacts occur. Agencies will
likely bear the initial burden of considering cumulative im-
pacts, since they have the broad authority, as well as the abil-
ity to review a series or group of actions, or to consider a re-
source as a whole, whereas a private project sponsor may
not. 3
F. Summary
Recent substantive cases reflect the increased sophistica-
tion of agencies and project sponsors in avoiding the prepara-
tion of an EIS by offering to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts. In addition, these cases show the reluctance of the
courts to go beyond traditional judicial review standards to
determine whether an agency has met its statutory mandates.
In order to preserve the integrity of the SEQRA process, judi-
cial attention should be focused on the need for public review
of proposed mitigation measures, the need to ensure that
agencies choose alternatives that make the most environmen-
tal sense and meet the statutory requirements, and that, to
the fullest extent practicable, the decision has avoided or mit-
igated the impacts.
!II. Procedural Aspects of SEQRA
Partial answers to procedural issues concerning the
SEQRA process were suggested by some early court cases.
Later decisions, however, have provided more complete expla-
nations. This section discusses these later cases.
73. In Save the Pine Bush, the city of Albany was encouraged to prepare a ge-
neric EIS to address the cumulative impacts of multiple projects. Save the Pine Bush,
Inc. v. City of Albany, 117 A.D.2d 267, 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (3d Dep't 1986).
The individual project sponsors might thereafter be charged a proportionate share of
the EIS preparation fee to partially reimburse the lead agency for its costs. N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.17 (1987).
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A. How Early in the Formulation of a Proposal for an Ac-
tion Does SEQRA Apply?
In Tri-County Taxpayers Association v. Town Board,1 '
the court of appeals held that the SEQRA process must be
complied with prior to the taking of any significant step by an
agency.7 5 This holding was based upon the statutory mandate
that "[a]s early as possible in the formulation of a proposal
for an action, the responsible agency shall make an initial de-
termination whether an environmental impact statement need
be prepared for the action. 7 6 Several variations on Tri-
County Taxpayers have occurred, and the question of just
when and under what circumstances a determination of signif-
icance is required has been answered with varying degrees of
consistency by the courts. In Devitt v. Heimbach, 7 the court
of appeals reviewed a county resolution approving the sale of
more than one hundred acres of land without the prior issu-
ance of a determination of significance. 78 The court held that
the resolution authorizing the sale was not properly passed
"because the County Legislature did not have prior to passing
that resolution either an EIS or a determination of non-signif-
icance ".9 In its decision, the court specifically relied on Tri-
County Taxpayers."0
Subsequent to Devitt, the court of appeals, in Program-
ming and Systems v. New York State Urban Development
Corp."1 considered an attempt to require an agency to make a
74. 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982).
75. Id. at 46-47, 432 N.E.2d at 594, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
76. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984).
77. 58 N.Y.2d 925, 447 N.E.2d 59, 460 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1983).
78. Id. at 928, 447 N.E.2d at 60-61, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 513. The county first acted
without having made any attempt to comply with SEQRA and then, upon being or-
dered to comply, was challenged on the negative declaration which it issued. Devitt v.
Heimbach, 109 Misc. 2d 463, 471, 440 N.Y.S.2d 465, 470 (1981).
79. Devitt, 58 N.Y.2d at 928, 447 N.E.2d at 61, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
80. Id. at 928, 447 N.E.2d at 60, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 513 (citing Tri-County Taxpay-
ers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982)).
81. 61 N.Y.2d 738, 460 N.E.2d 1347, 472 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1984). In this case, the
proceeding was brought by a lessee who feared that the Urban Development Corpora-
tion might undertake eminent domain proceedings and hinder his rights. See also
Pizzuti v. Metro. Transit Auth., 114 A.D.2d 943, 495 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1985)(re-
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determination of significance. In Programming and Systems,
the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was involved in
the redevelopment of the neighborhood around 42nd Street in
Manhattan. The court found that because only preliminary
steps in planning for redevelopment had occurred, an impact
statement was not required. 2 No EIS was needed until a spe-
cific project plan was actually formulated and proposed. At
that time, however, prior to acting on the proposal, an envi-
ronmental impact statement would have to be prepared and
made available to the public. 83 As it did in Devitt, the court
again relied on its decision in Tri-County Taxpayers.8 4
The court's holding in Programming and Systems raises
the question of how early in an action SEQRA must be trig-
gered. Had the UDC in Programming and Systems used the
SEQRA mechanism early in its planning process, before the
formulation of a specific proposal, SEQRA would have been
able to help shape the proposal that was prepared rather than
being a mere procedural afterthought prior to final approval.8
If SEQRA need only be complied with immediately prior to
an approval resolution, its use as a planning tool is obviated
and the statutory mandate to act early in the formulation of
an action is effectively ignored.
B. Interrelation of SEQRA with Other Statutory Require-
ments for Agencies
An issue related to the procedural aspects of SEQRA is
how those procedures mesh with other statutory mechanisms
which control agency decision-making. In Sun Beach Real Es-
tate Development Corp. v. Anderson, 6 the Second Depart-
garding Em. Dom. Proc. Law, section 207 proceedings); Jackson v. New York State
Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 494 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1st Dep't 1985)(dealing with a
project related to the Programming and Systems case).
82. Programming and Systems, 61 N.Y.2d at 739, 460 N.E.2d at 1349, 472
N.Y.S.2d at 913.
83. Id., 460 N.E.2d at 1348, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
84. Id., 460 N.E.2d at 1348, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
85. This might have been done through use of a generic EIS as provided in N.Y.
Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.15 (1987).
86. 98 A.D.2d 367, 469 N.Y.S.2d 964 (2d Dep't 1983).
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ment considered the interrelation between section 276 of the
Town LaW 7 and SEQRA. Section 276 requires a planning
board to issue its preliminary plat approval within forty-five
days after the receipt of a complete application.s In Sun
Beach, a town planning board required that a draft EIS be
prepared. While the board awaited the submission of the
DEIS, the forty-five days from submission of the plat ran out.
The applicant then brought a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. 9
The court approved the town's action on the application
within forty-five days after acceptance of the DEIS, rather
than after submission of the original application. In doing so,
the court took note of the legislative purpose behind SEQRA
of relating environmental considerations to the planning pro-
cess, 90 in addition to the requirement that the SEQRA process
be coordinated with other procedures dealing with the review
and approval of an action. 1 The court found that preliminary
plat approval was "so significant a determination during the
[subdivision approval] process that an environmental impact
statement must be deemed a prerequisite to the approval. '9 2
The significance of the Sun Beach case is that SEQRA was
deemed both to take precedence over another statutory time
frame, and to be non-waivable by an agency.
C. Classifying Actions as Type I, Type II, or Unlisted
Although the classification of actions as Type I, Type II,
87. N.Y. Town Law § 276 (McKinney 1987).
88. Id. § 276(3).
89. Sun Beach, 98 A.D.2d at 368-69, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 966-67. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
& R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1981) is referred to as an article 78 proceeding.
90. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984).
91. Id. § 8-0109(5).
92. Sun Beach Real Estate Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 98 A.D.2d 367, 372, 469
N.Y.S.2d 964, 969 (2d Dep't 1983). It is doubtful that the court meant to require an
EIS because many plat approvals are made upon findings of no significant impact. It
is more likely that the court meant to say that either a negative declaration or a
DEIS is a prerequisite. While the idea that issuing a positive declaration effectively
stays any further agency action on an application may be troubling to project spon-
sors, they have the ability to move the process along by timely and efficient prepara-
tion of an acceptable DEIS.
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or Unlisted"3 is separate from the issue of the need for an
EIS,e4 the two issues overlap and have been confused occa-
sionally by the courts. The Part 617 SEQRA regulations spec-
ify Type I actions as those actions which are more likely to
have a significant impact on the environment and therefore
are more likely to require an EIS.93 Type II actions are
deemed to be non-significant and never trigger any determi-
nation of significance.96 In between Type I and Type II ac-
tions are the Unlisted actions for which no presumption of
need for an environmental impact statement exists, but for
which a determination of significance needs to be made using
the criteria provided in the regulations similar to determina-
tions of the Type I actions.97 The regulations require the use
of a long form EAF for all Type I actions. 8
The court of appeals made clear in Devitt that both the
statewide Type I list and the local agency's placement of an
otherwise Unlisted action on its own Type I list required the
agency to treat the action as Type IV9 Although Devitt con-
cerned an agency's attempt to ignore its own Type I list, that
case should be compared with Group for the South Fork, Inc.
v. Suffolk County Water Authority.00 In this case, the Au-
thority's own Type II list included the installation of certain
sized water mains. 1'0 Arguably, the designation of that action
as Type II was inconsistent with the purposes of SEQRA. Ad-
ditionally, the town in which the action occurred designated
93. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0113(2)(c) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 617.12, 617.13 (1987).
94. A full environmental assessment form (EAF) or similar document must be
used for Type I actions. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.5(b) (1987). Un-
listed actions require either a short or a full EAF. Id. § 617.5(c).
95. Id. § 617.12.
96. Id. § 617.13.
97. Id. §§ 617.4, 617.11.
98. Id. § 617.5(b).
99. Section 617.4 allows for individual agency adoption of SEQRA regulations
including Type I and Type II lists which are consistent with the statewide lists. N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.4 (1987).
100. Slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Mar. 1, 1985) on file at Pace Envtl.
Law Rev. office.
101. Id. at 2.
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such an action as Type I in its SEQRA regulations."0 2 The
court held that the Authority was bound by the town's regula-
tions and thus it could not act prior to a determination of sig-
nificance by the town.10 3 Thus, although the courts recognize
the flexibility granted to agencies by the statute to tailor their
Type I and Type II lists to their own needs, the statute's con-
sistency and "interagency respect" provisions have been
supported.
Another case involving interaction between the Type I
and Type II list which raises some confusion is Houser v. Fin-
neran.0 14 In that case the respondent, the chairman of the
state Cable Commission, determined that the granting of a
cable franchise was a Type II action because the action was
merely an extension of a utility distribution facility. 10 5 Special
Term found that the action constituted a Type I action be-
cause it occurred contiguous to an historic building.106 The ap-
pellate division based its affirmance on the fact that the pow-
ers granted in the franchise went far beyond the mere
extension of utility distribution lines, because the franchise
also authorized construction of towers and poles. However,
the court did not explicitly disagree with Special Term's as-
sumption that an activity classed as Type II could be taken
out of that category because it met a Type I threshold.10 7
Such a conclusion would be contrary to the purposes of the
statute and regulations. 08 Type II actions should never re-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3. The regulations provide that "[n]o agency shall issue a decision on
an action that it knows any other involved agency has determined may have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment, until a final EIS and findings statement have been
filed." N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.3(a) (1987). The statute and regula-
tions also require that local SEQRA rules be consistent with those adopted by DEC
for statewide application. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0113(3) (McKinney 1984);
N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.5(f) (1987).
104. 99 A.D.2d 926, 473 N.Y.S.2d 50 (3d Dep't 1984).
105. Id. at 926, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §
617.13(d)(20) (1978)).
106. Id. at 926, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
107. Id. at 926-27, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (relying on N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 6, § 617.13(d)(8) (1978)).
108. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0113(2)(c) (McKinney 1984). N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.13 (1987). With the exception of replacement of a facil-
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quire even a determination of significance.109 Only Unlisted
actions which occur under such circumstances would be
treated as Type I. To the extent that the Cable Commission's
action actually went beyond what was contemplated by the
Type II list, the Appellate Division's decision is correct.110
D. When Is an Environmental Assessment Form Required?
Although the regulations now provide for the use of a
short form EAF for Unlisted actions, such use was optional.'
Despite the scheme set forth in the regulations, the courts
have taken different and occasionally conflicting views of the
EAF/EIS requirements and the relationship of the require-
ments to whether an action is Type I, Type II, or Unlisted.
In Tehan v. Scrivani, 1 2 petitioner challenged a negative
declaration on a subdivision plat approval. The approval was
an Unlisted action for which the planning board did not use,
and was not required by law to use, an EAF."' The petitioner,
a neighbor of the project proponent, had submitted an engi-
neering report to the town showing potential soil erosion and
well pollution problems that the planning board ignored. The
court held that, under the circumstances, the board could not
have taken the requisite "hard look" absent the use of an
EAF.114 The court apparently concluded that the lack of an
EAF made it unclear as to whether or not the agency had
properly reviewed the action.' 6
ity in kind, no Type II action can ever be treated as either Type I or Unlisted.
109. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.13(a) (1987).
110. See also Badura v. Guelli, 94 A.D.2d 972, 464 N.Y.S.2d 98 (4th Dep't
1983)(regarding rezoning as a Type I action); and Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Plan-
ning Bd., 96 A.D.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983)(in which the court held
that the agency had ignored the section 617.12 thresholds).
111. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.7(b) (1978). The 1987 revised
regulations now mandate the use of the short EAF as a minimum requirement. Id. §
617.5(c) (1987).
112. 97 A.D.2d 769, 468 N.Y.S.2d 402 (2d Dep't 1983).
113. Id. at 771, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 405. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §
617.7(b) (1978).
114. Tehan, 97 A.D.2d at 771, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 405. See supra note 5.
115. Once an action has been classified as Type I or Unlisted, information about
the action is compared with criteria to determine its significance. N.Y. Comp. Codes
R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11 (1987).
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The use of an EAF to review the SEQRA criteria and to
undertake the requisite "hard look" was also an issue in Niel-
sen v. Planning Board," 6 in which the court held that prepa-
ration of an EAF subsequent to review was not sufficient to
constitute literal compliance with SEQRA. 1 7 In contrast to
Nielsen is Town of Victory v. Flacke,11 a in which the town
assumed that a landfill proposal was a Type I action. In that
case, the Department of Environmental Conservation issued a
negative declaration without the use of a long form EAF. The
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that the nega-
tive declaration was not issued arbitrarily, was not a failure of
literal compliance, and did not require reversal of the Com-
missioner's determination, because the department had done
the same analysis that would have been done using an EAF. " 9
One may understand, in part, the inconsistency of one court
requiring an EAF for an Unlisted action, while another court
sanctions the failure to use an EAF for a denominated Type I
action, by reviewing the differing facts of each case and by
recognizing that the EAF is a model form, and that the nature
of SEQRA reviews allows agencies to fashion their own com-
parable documents.
E. When is an Environmental Impact Statement Required?
As noted above, the classification of an action as Type I
does not per se require an EIS.1 20 However, there still appears
116. 110 A.D.2d. 767, 487 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1985) modifying and aff'g
N. Y. Sup Ct., Suffolk County (McInerney, J.)(Oct. 12, 1983). See also E.F.S. Ven-
tures Corp. v. Foster, 128 A.D.2d 28, 514 N.Y.S.2d 981 (2d Dep't 1987), rev'd, 71
N.Y.2d 359, 520 N.E.2d 1345, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1988).
117. It should be noted that a question exists as to whether the action involved
was a Type I or Unlisted; the issue was not clearly dealt with by the court.
118. 101 A.D.2d 1016, 476 N.Y.S.2d 711 (4th Dep't 1984).
119. Id. at 1016, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 711. See supra note 14.
120. See Devitt v. Heimbach, 58 N.Y.2d 925, 447 N.E.2d 59, 460 N.Y.S.2d 512
(1983); and Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 117 A.D.2d 267, 502 N.Y.S.2d
540 (3d Dep't 1986) for the point that no absolute requirement to prepare an EIS
exists for Type I actions.
The statute and regulations consider that Type I actions are more likely to re-
quire an EIS. The action still must be compared with the section 617.11 criteria to
determine whether or not an EIS is needed.
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to be some judicial confusion on this point. In Badura v.
Guelli,'21 the town board approved a fifty-two acre rezoning to
allow an auto salvage business adjacent to a wetland which
contained a great blue heron rookery. The court held that the
action was Type I and that therefore an EIS was required.122
In this case, the court may have hedged its bet on the issue of
whether a Type I action requires an EIS by adding that, in
any case, there were significant impacts that the board failed
to address. 23
The criteria listed in the regulations are more critical
than the classification of an action in determining whether an
EIS is required. The court in Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v.
Planning Board24 noted that both Type I and Unlisted ac-
tions must be compared to the criteria and that "once a cer-
tain threshold is reached, an EIS must be filed." 2 ' Although
an action on the Type I list is more likely to require an EIS,
there clearly may be projects which fall into that classification
which do not have potentially significant impacts. The Type I
presumption puts the burden on the project sponsor, in the
first instance, to prove there will be no significant impact.
While the courts should be encouraged to keep in mind the
low threshold of SEQRA in requiring an EIS, the courts
should also require that significant environmental issues be
raised in order to warrant the judicial mandate of an EIS.
Conversely, an Unlisted action that meets the criteria for de-
termining environmental significance should be treated with
the same respect as a Type I action for purposes of agency
and judicial review.
F. What Part Does the Public Play in SEQRA?
SEQRA allows for, and encourages, public participation
121. 94 A.D.2d 972, 464 N.Y.S.2d 98 (4th Dep't 1983).
122. Id. at 973, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
123. See also Group for the South Fork, Inc. v. Suffolk County Water Auth., slip
op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Mar. 1, 1985). In this case, the court con-
cluded that designation as a Type I action per se required an EIS.
124. 96 A.D.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983).
125. Id. at 987, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
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in agency decision making.126 In addition to including com-
ment periods on a draft EIS, the statute allows for hearings
on a project for which no hearing may otherwise be available.
Questions arise as to what part the public plays in these hear-
ings, their usefulness in shaping a project, and whether there
can be too many hearings. There are no definitive answers to
these questions, but review of the following case may be
enlightening.
In Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New
York, 7 petitioner sought to block a large-scale residential
and commercial project on the site of an abandoned railroad
yard encompassing more than seventy-five acres on the upper
west side of Manhattan.'28 The project sponsor had to appear
before various city departments, as well as community boards;
it also held informal meetings with those entities. After the
submission and revision of the DEIS, there were more meet-
ings with the community boards. Hearings were held over a
four month period and modifications of the project were made
as a direct result of community board participation. In up-
holding the city's approval of the project, following over two
years of informal and formal review, the court considered the
procedural history of the project, including the opportunity
for public input. There is an implication that such a large de-
gree of public input on a project ensures that the reviewing
agency has taken the requisite hard look at environmental
consequences of the proposed action.'29
Clearly, there are many projects which are shielded from
public review, particularly when negative declarations are is-
126. SEQRA provides the opportunity for public comment and hearing on some
governmental decisions which do not generally require public participation, thus giv-
ing the public an arena for redress. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0109(2), (4), (5), &
(6) (McKinney 1984).
127. 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 805, 457
N.E.2d 795, 469 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1983).
128. The original project proposal was never built, and the parcel is now the site
of a proposal by developer Donald Trump to build the world's largest building and a
multitude of satellite buildings.
129. See supra note 45. See also Manes v. Simpson, 108 A.D.2d 914, 485
N.Y.S.2d 802 (2d Dep't 1985)(in which project opponents were given six months to
undertake their own environmental review while the project was suspended).
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sued by a single reviewing agency, or when the project is an
Unlisted action. So, too, there are project reviews in which the
public process is used as a bludgeon to kill or delay a project
rather than to reshape it into an environmentally acceptable
form. Both extremes are regrettable abuses of the SEQRA
process. The public has a valuable role to play in bringing in-
formation to the attention of agency decision-makers, in help-
ing to shape a project as the best environmental alternative,
as well as, occasionally, in checking potential government,
abuse of the SEQRA process.
G. When is a Supplemental EIS Required?
SEQRA contemplates a process which is not static and in
which information may be and, on occasion, should be up-
dated or broadened. 130 However, the statute and regulations
also recognize the need for finality of review. 131 Only a few
cases to date have discussed the need for supplementing a
draft or a final EIS. As more complex projects and permitting
procedures loom ahead, however, the issue of supplements will
arise more frequently.13
The need for, and the procedural treatment of, a supple-
ment were reviewed by the Second Department in Glen Head-
Glenwood Landing Civic Council v. Town of Oyster Bay.133 In
that case the town was challenged on its rezoning of a parcel
of land to allow a condominium development. Subsequent to
130. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0109(2), (3) (McKinney 1984).
131. Id. §§ 8-0107, -0113(2)(i); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.3(1)
(1987).
132. The subject of supplements first arose in Webster Assoc. v. Town of Web-
ster, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). The project opponent
alleged that incorporating new material in the FEIS was improper, unless the DEIS
was recirculated with the additional material. Id. at 226, 451 N.E.2d at 191, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 433. The court of appeals noted that, although the brief comment period
of ten days afforded an FEIS could not substitute for the fuller thirty day minimum
review on a DEIS, the particular facts of this case did not call for anything further.
Id. at 228, 451 N.E.2d at 191, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 433. Presumably, that further require-
ment would have been a supplement to the DEIS requiring a minimum thirty day
comment period. The record in Webster showed full consideration by the town and
the public of the missing information, which was the alternative of a rival developer's
proposed shopping center.
133. 88 A.D.2d 484, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dep't 1982).
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the circulation of a final EIS, the town was informed that the
assured sewer hook-up with a neighboring community had not
been approved. The town failed to inform other agencies or
the parties of that significant information. The court pointed
mainly to NEPA cases for the proposition that an agency has
a "continuing duty to evaluate new information relevant to
the environmental impact of its actions . .. so that important
new information will not be ignored by the decision maker".13 4
The court held that a supplemental FEIS was required and
"should have been circulated and reviewed in the same man-
ner as an original statement".'3"
In Horn v. IBM, 36 the Second Department recently con-
sidered whether new information should have been provided
as a supplement to a draft EIS rather than included in the
final EIS. The court recognized that significant new informa-
tion requires a supplement, and that omissions from a DEIS
cannot be cured by including the data in a final EIS because
the review period for the latter is too abbreviated.137 The
court found, however, that the omitted information was "not
sufficiently novel or probative as to require a circulation of a
supplemental DGEIS". 18 Furthermore, the court found that
the public comment period on the final GEIS extended more
than three weeks and thus there was adequate public
scrutiny. 39
These cases help to answer the question of when a sup-
plement is needed, but they imply that, in some instances, in-
clusion of new information in an FEIS will suffice if the FEIS
has an extended comment period. They also give some insight
as to what information is considered significant enough to
warrant the additional burden of a supplement.'4"
134. Id. at 494-95, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
135. Id. at 495, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
136. 110 A.D.2d 87, 493 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1985). See also Horn v. County
of Westchester, 106 A.D.2d 612, 482 N.Y.S.2d 896 (2d Dep't 1984)(a related case).
137. The draft EIS in this case was a draft generic EIS.
138. Horn, 110 A.D.2d at 97, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
139. Id. at 98, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
140. The Court of Appeals, in Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67
N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986), recognized that a final EIS
could expand on information analyzed in a draft EIS. The court allowed non-substan-
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SEQRA IN THE COURTS
H. Summary
In giving guidance to agencies, applicants, and attorneys
on when an action is subject to SEQRA, what documentation
and public record is required, and when a decision becomes
final, the courts have generally continued to adhere to the lit-
eral compliance standard referred to earlier."' There have
even been some instances where the courts have gone beyond
the statute in what they have required." In cases such as Te-
han v. Scrivani"3 and Coalition Against Lincoln West""' the
courts have evidenced a concern for open and adequate gov-
ernment decision-making and public review; while in cases
such as Sun Beach"15 and Horn v. IBM,14 6 the courts have
been sensitive to an applicant's need for timeliness and final-
ity of review.
Since 1982, all four appellate divisions appear more will-
ing to apply strictly the procedural requirements of the stat-
ute and the regulations, and to better understand the impor-
tant purposes served by the strict procedural standards.
IV. Conclusion
The many opinions issued in the past six years have pro-
vided helpful guidance on the statutory and regulatory man-
dates of SEQRA. Applicants and agencies have been given
some assistance in working through the process by such publi-
cations as the SEQRA Handbook." 7 Interesting issues which
remain to be fleshed out are the timing issues not satisfacto-
tial post-FEIS project modification to be done on the basis of a separate negative
declaration. The court found that the changes were not substantial enough to warrant
a supplement. Id. at 430, 494 N.E.2d at 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
141. Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67
(2d Dep't 1981). See supra notes 32-33.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
143. 97 A.D.2d 769, 468 N.Y.S.2d 402 (2d Dep't 1983).
144. 94 A.D.2d 483, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 805, 457
N.E.2d 795, 469 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1983).
145. 98 A.D.2d 367, 469 N.Y.S.2d 964 (2d Dep't 1983).
146. 110 A.D.2d 87, 493 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1985).
147. N.Y. Dep't Envtl. Conservation, SEQRA Handbook (Mar. 1982)(available
from the Department, 50 Wolf Road, Albany, N.Y. 12233).
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rily addressed by the court of appeals in Programming and
Systems;14 8 threshold issues raised by conditioned negative
declaration cases; cumulative impact issues raised in the Chi-
nese Staff and Workers 49 and in Jackson v. New York State
Urban Development Corp.;150 and alternatives issues, particu-
larly concerning private applicants.
The appellate level courts of New York have shed some,
if not all, of their early unwillingness to deal with the policies
and procedures of SEQRA, although it is apparent the courts
still feel more comfortable with the concrete procedural issues
rather than the discretionary substantive issues. As we recede
further from the environmental enthusiasm of the early
1970's, it will be interesting to see how the statutory mandates
of SEQRA continue to influence government decision-making.
148. 61 N.Y.2d 738, 460 N.E.2d 1347, 472 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1984).
149. 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
150. 67 N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986).
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